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Abstract 
 
The issue of corporate governance has been emerging as important phenomena that has been 
searched extensively both in developed countries due to its strategic impact on the monitoring of 
management activities and firms’ performance. Yet little attempt has been made in developing 
countries like Malaysia to ascertain what constitute corporate governance and its impact on firm's 
performance. Therefore, this study aims at examining the structure of the corporate governance and 
its impact on firm’s performance. This study is based on 100 firms, which are the component of the 
Composite Index (CI) serve as market barometer. This study employs cross-sectional annual 
multiple regression model to examine, what constitutes the corporate governance structure and its 
impact on performance of the firm. The analysis was based on annual regression over 5 years 
period from 1997 through 2001. Three different blend of surrogate for corporate governance were 
developed for good corporate governance structure. These are the independent non-executive 
(outside) directors, audit committee and remuneration committee. To isolate the size effect from the 
impact of corporate governance structure on firm’s performance, firm’s size was also included are 
variable in the model. The ratio of net income before tax to total asset is used as a surrogate for 
firm’s performance. Evidence from the study indicates that there is partial relation between 
corporate governance structure and corporate performance. The presence of both audit and 
remuneration committee serves as an important monitoring device to control management activities 
that lead to increase firm's performance. While on average, the presence of independent non-
executive directors does not provide any significant explanation for the firm's performance. 
However, the firm size appears to have significant impact on corporate performance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
odern corporate finance literature focuses on two competing issues governing the management 
behaviour. These are agency theory and theory of corporate control. Agency theory posits that there 
is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and managers because of the existence of 
separation of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their seminal work on agency relationship 
propose the idea that agency conflict could have been reduced at a maximum level by making the managers part of the 
owners. The belief is that once the managers become part of the owners, they will be more responsible in making 
corporate management decision that will create the value for the firms. The relationship between the good corporate 
governance structure and firms performance has been the subject of interest and an on going debate due to its strategic 
implication for the firm’s value, and monitoring effect of management activities. This issue has gained a considerable 
attention in the recent years after the collapse of Enron, a giant utility firm and the collapse of World.com, a 
worldwide telecommunication giant in the United States of America.  
 
So far there is no universally agreed definition of the corporate governance but tt aims to ensure a process to 
be implemented within an organisation to direct the company affairs toward business prosperity and corporate 
accountability. In other words, it aims to maximise shareholders' value where the organisation is managed with 
prudence and integrity. Since directors are the custodian of the firms and are being elected by the owners to safeguard 
M 
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their interest, there is ardent need to examine the board structure and any other forms that self regulate the 
management activities. Though there is increasing empirical evidence on corporate governance in developed market 
but little attention has been given in this in less institutionally advanced economies such as Malaysia, to examine what 
constitutes corporate governance structure and its impact on firm’s performance. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows:  section two provides theoretical and empirical perspectives on corporate governance and firms’ performance. 
Section three briefly describes the data and methodology used in this paper. Findings, conclusion and implication are 
presents in the section four. 
 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
 
The understanding of the empirical differences in the pattern of corporate governance has advanced in recent 
years. However, theoretical development in this area of research is yet limited. There is number of studies that attempt 
to explain theoretically why control is so concentrated with poor shareholders protection in a setting where alignment 
is the only viable mechanism of corporate governance (La Porta et al. 1999; Bebchuck 1999)). La Porta et al. (2002) 
make the case for higher concentration of cash flow as a function of quality of investors’ protection. However, the 
empirical evidences suggested three generic measures to control agency problem. These are aligning the managers’ 
incentive with that of shareholders, monitored debt and take over threat. However, this study suggests three blend of 
governance structures namely, independent board and effective audit and remuneration committee, alignment of 
managerial interest with those of outside shareholders and block shareholders as external monitoring device to ensure 
shareholders interests are protected.  
 
The principle of corporate governance promotes the idea of fairness and accountability. The assumption is 
that the companies that adopt high level of corporate accountability and fairness will have strong and sustained 
impetus to perform well with greater transparency and hence leaving little room for the agent to mismanage 
companies’ activities which may have detrimental effect on firms’ value. Admittingly, there are number of factors 
identified by both researchers and practitioners alike, to establish a concept of good corporate governance that lead to 
achieving the companies' objectives based on principle of sound corporate governance represented by effective 
internal and external control systems, transparency and management competency and competent board of directors. 
Recently, the introduction of independent non-executive directors as mechanism to control management activities is 
the latest phenomenon that is attracting the attention of researchers and academics.  
 
The independent (non-executive) directors have similar connotation of not being involved in the day-to-day 
operation of a company. However, it is highly suspicious that they are truly independent unless they possess right to 
act independently which is the freedom to express their personal view or they are not under the influence of the top 
management team or the influential shareholders. Hence independent board serves as a monitoring device to control 
management activities. The board independent usually requires that members not closely related to the company but 
have vested economics or financial interest on the firms residuals. Hence this could be further argued that such 
independent board members can significantly contribute to decision making of the board by bringing more objective 
view to the evaluation of the performance of the board management. Though, the depth of directors’ independence is 
more formal than substantial, the percentage of independent directors brought on the board is still relatively small 
minority in most of the developing countries.  
 
In the past, the aspect of including the non-executive directors into board was not given due importance as it 
was not required by law of the land, nonetheless, imposition of such requirement may encourage greater effective 
representation of independent non-executive directors among the board. Hence it may bring greater transparency and 
integrity in the firm activities and reporting.  In US, the percentage of outside directors is on the rise while it is a 
statutory requirement in Malaysia to have 1/3 of the board as the independent and non-executive directors. However, 
how effective are the independent directors remained illusive in this less institutionally advanced country. This may be 
because; enforcement of corporate governance practice came into being only in 2000. Thus the corporate governance 
is its early stage of the development of good corporate governance culture among the Malaysian companies.  
 
It is important to note that audit committee and remuneration committee presumably could continue to serve 
as the corporate watchdogs to ensure the management accountability and responsibility towards shareholders by 
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ensuring that managers present true and fair view of the firms and avoid irregularities. Therefore, both independent 
directors and the remuneration committee and audit committee will serve as the blend of good corporate governance 
structure in creating firm's performance.   
 
More importantly, the issue on the agency problem has been well documented in corporate finance literature. 
As pointed in the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the managerial ownership could serve as a positive 
monitoring substitute in the agency relation in aligning the managerial interest with those of outside shareholders. 
They further argued that if there were no debt contracts, agency problem reduces to moral hazard between the 
manager and owners.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that making the manager the owner of the firm could 
mitigate againts this basic problem.  Since managers (inside owners) have opportunity to earn additional income, they 
would do so by appropriating additional benefits derived from firms' activities. They have expertise to turn the 
operating activities of the firms, hence increasing the value of the firm rather than shrinking it. Managers thus have an 
incentive to choose a good corporate governance structure through which they can nurture investors’ confidence as a 
mean of increasing the firms’ value in which their stakes are tied. Thus, the higher level of ownership is a means of re-
aligning the interest of inside shareholders with that of minority shareholders. This, by itself serves as a blend of 
corporate governance structure. However, Demsetz (1983) and Fama and   Jensen (1983a, 1983b) pointed out that 
higher level of managerial ownership could lead to management entrenchment, because control challenges are 
difficult to mount by outside stockholders. Following this line of reasoning, Mork et al.(1986) hypothesised a non-
linear relation between manager ownership and corporate performance. 
 
In Malaysia, the ownership concentration has been weak, compared to most developed countries. The 
institutional ownership accounts for less than 20% of the outstanding shares (Huson, 2003). Therefore, it is important 
to determine whether or not such concentration could have any visible impact on corporate governance. Berle and 
Means (1982) suggest the existence of positive linear relationship between ownership concentration (block 
shareholding or institutional investors) and firm performance. The issue was later advanced by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), and their result confirms the findings of Berle and Means (1982). Their findings highlighted the important role 
played by large shareholders as a monitoring device, to control management activities and hence increase the share 
price of the firms’ by increasing the proportion of shares held by these large shareholders. Hill and Snell (1988) 
showed that ownership structure affect firm’s performance as the ownership concentration motivates innovation that 
leads to value maximization. Hill and Snell (1989) also confirm this positive relation using US firms by taking 
productivity as a measure of firm's performance. However, the findings of McConnel and Servaes (1990) give 
contrary view, although their result suggests the existence of certain joint influence of concentration and insider 
ownership. The findings of  Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) support the hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) that the existence of large block holders leads to both monitoring of managers and better performance, 
especially in firms,  in which ownership is concentrated in institutional investors. This also serves as another blend of 
corporate governance structure. 
 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) examined whether the separation of incumbency roles of board chairman and 
CEO enhanced the protection of shareholders interest. Evidence indicated that the separation of the role of board 
chairman and CEO would result in separation of power so that no directors will have dominant role in the board. 
Although this seems to be a driving factor in examining the compliance of corporate governance and corporate 
performance, however it is not applicable in Malaysian context as CEO is not commonly used in Malaysian 
incorporation. Exploring on the issue, Benjamin Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) examined the effects of board 
composition and direct incentives in public utility firms’ performance. Although public utility firms are not profit 
orientated, the compensation packages for senior managers somehow have impact on firm performance. In early 
1990s The relationship between the governance structure and corporate performance has become a hot issue. 
Catherine Dail and Dalton (1992) focused specifically on the role of founder chief executive officers and the 
composition of boards of directors on corporate performance. They found some support for the ability of founder and 
non-founder CEOs to relinquish the tight control and effectively guide the growth of the firms. Their findings suggest 
that there are strong linkages between the CEO and directors and firm performance among the largest firms. 
Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that even strongest linkages are evidenced in the more modestly sized firms.  
In a similar study, Ezzamel and Watson (1993) again examined the relationship between organisational form, 
ownership structure and corporate performance using UK companies and two sets of variable. Firstly, they examined 
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the extent to which contextual variables such as perceived environment uncertainty and age of the organisational form 
moderate the relationship between organisational form and corporate performance. Secondly, it examined the possible 
effects of ownership and control structures on performance. The study had proven that those two measures have direct 
impact on corporate performance. 
 
To advance on the issue, Anup and Charles (1996) examined seven mechanisms to control agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. These are shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large block shareholders, 
use of outside directors, debt policy, the managerial labour market and the market for corporate control. These 
mechanisms form part of compliance of corporate governance and make it transparent. The finding shows a 
significant relationship between firm performance and four of the mechanisms stated above when each is included in a 
separate OLS regression.  While James and Morra (1997) has reviewed the literature on Corporate Decision Making 
in Canada and concluded that there is no existence of relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. Similar study undertaken by Regan (1998) and examined the relationship between the board governance 
and corporate performance. However, no significant relationship was observed between the corporate governance and 
corporate performance. 
 
The issue was further advanced by Scott and Rosenstein (1998) who examined the relationship between 
board composition, managerial ownership and firm's performance. The results indicate some support for the 
curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and performance posited by Stulz (1988) and empirical 
findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
 
In a more recent study, David and Wier (1999) have analysed the extent of Cadbury compliance of corporate 
governance and its impact on corporate performance in UK firms. Using data for 1992 and 1995 because the UK firms. 
Evidenced indicates that the duality is less common while firms tend to have more than 3 non-executive directors, 
there has been an almost universal adoption of board subcommittees such as the remuneration and audit committee. 
However, it is found that there is a little evidence that the board characteristics recommended by Cadbury has resulted 
or moved towards an improvement in firm's performance. The only compliance of governance structure that has lead 
to improved firm performance is the presence of audit and remuneration committee. 
 
DATA AND METHOD OF ESTIMATION 
 
A sample of 100 firms most of which are drawn from CI component firms which serve as market barometer 
over the period 1997 through 2001 were studied. The proxies for corporate governance and firms performance are 
extracted from companies’ annual handbook, companies’ annual reports and many other sources. 
 
The study uses multivariate regressions model to examine the impact of corporate governance structure on 
firm’s performance. We use annualised regression over a period of 5years.  Corporate governance is constituted by 
diverse board composition proxied by independent non-executive directors, presence of both audit committee and 
remuneration committee, managerial ownership (director’s ownership) and positive monitoring substitute into agency 
relationship and block shareholding represented by institutional ownership. 
 
Model Specification 
 
Y = β0+β1 (NED1)+β2 (NED2)+β3 (NED3)+β4 (NED4)+β5 (COM)+β6 (MKTCP) + β7 IOWN+ β8DOWN+  
Where 
 
 Y – this is corporate performance proxied by level of net income before tax divided firm’s total asset 
 NED1 – This measures the number of independent non-executive directors (NED) on the board. Cadbury 
Report by David and Wier (1999) state that independent non-executive directors should have positive 
influence on the performance of the company. Thus, it is believed that a company with higher number of 
independent non-executive directors should perform better than companies with smaller numbers. 
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Analytical Framework 
 
Board Structure 
Presence of Remuneration 
Committee 
A board has at least 3 or more 
Independent Non Executive 
Directors 
Independent Non Executive 
Directors represent more or less 
than 50% on the board 
Percentage of Independent Non 
Executive Directors on the 
board 
Number of Independent Non 
Executive Directors on the 
board 
Market Capitalization 
(Size of Organisation) 
Corporate Performance 
Profitability 
(Return on Assets) 
Managerial ownership 
Institutional ownership 
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 NED2 – This is the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board. As independent non-
executive directors are expected to effectively monitor the executive members, the percentage of independent 
non-executive sitting in the board is believed to positively influence on the company's performance. 
 NED3 – This is the binary variable, which has a value of one if independent non-executive directors 
represent at least 50 per cent of the board and zero for otherwise. It is expected that organisations with more 
than 50 per cent of independent non-executive directors would have better monitoring system. 
 NED4 – This is the binary variable which has a value of one if a board has three or more independent non 
executive directors and zero if there are fewer than three independent non executive directors. The Cadbury 
Committee (UK) recommended that a minimum of three independent non-executive directors is necessary for 
effective monitoring of the board. It is believed that a firm with at least three independent non-executive 
directors would perform better than firms with lesser than three. 
 Com – This refers to the presence of audit and remuneration committee. It is a binary variable taking a value 
of one if a company has both committees and zero otherwise. It is believed that there is positive relationship 
between the presence of committee and performance 
 DOWN- this refers to the percentage of share owned by the directors and it is included to examine the extend 
to which managerial interest is re-aligned with that of minority shareholders. 
 IOWN – this refers to the percentage of ownership control by the institutional investors which serve as a 
monitoring device to oversee the management activities. 
 MKTP – This is the market capitalization measuring the size and it is used as a control measure to analyse the 
extent of size effects present in the governance structure. 
 
NED1 = Number of Independent Non Executive Directors on the board 
NED2 = Percentage of Independent Non Executive Directors on the board 
NED3 = Independent Non Executive Directors represent more or less than 50% on the board (dummy variable).  
NED4 = A board has at least 3 or more Independent Non Executive Directors (dummy variable)  
Y = Corporate Performance measured by earnings before tax to total asset abbreviated by ROA. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Table One: Corporate governance and Firm's Performance, 1997-2001 
 
*, ** indicates significant level at 10% and 5% respectively.  Average Durbin Watson 2.03.  Average F-value 2.37 
(P=. 04954) 
 
 
The finding appears to suggest that the presence of both audit and remuneration committees (as proxied for 
corporate governance structure) does play an important role for the firms performance for the period 1997 to 1999 
(economics downturn). However, the presence of independent (non-executive) directors, managerial ownership and 
block shareholding do not provide any significant account for firm’s performance except in year 1999. This could due 
to fact that in 1999 Malaysian government had undertaken various measures to restore investors’ confidence after the 
Variable\ 
t-value 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average  
t-value 
NED1 1.7411* 1.4529 0.2381 .3408 -1.267 .50118 
NED2 -1.2857 -.87312 2.7880 .9471 -1.090 .0972 
NED3 1.5667 -0.8265 -3.506*** -1.168 .7056 -.6456 
NED4 -0.6695 -0.7506 -2.3233** -1.270 .94495 -.8137 
Com 2.4454** 2.73509*** 2.014** 1.442 .68717 1.8647* 
MKTCP 1.9717* 1.1359 2.6433*** 2.746 2.6212 2.2236** 
IOWN -.7965 -.9156 .5415 -.2256 -.56039 -.3913 
DOWN -1.6664 -.9187 -.380 -.8767 -.2824 -.8248 
R-Square 0.1977 0.1705 0.224 0.127 .1344 .17072 
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financial crisis in 1997 and 1998. The firm’s size, which is proxied by market capitalization, appears to have 
significant impact on firm’s performance. Thus, corporate governance structure partially explains for the performance 
of the firms. The percentage of independent non-executive directors is not found to have any significant impact on 
firm's performance. The institutional ownership, which serves as large shareholders to monitor management activities 
also, does not provide any explanation for the changes in firms’ performance. Furthermore, managerial ownership 
does not appear to provide any form of control mechanism to enhance firm's performance. The sign of the coefficients 
are expected and 17.07% of changes in corporate performance are explained by selected corporate governance 
variables. The model is significant at 5% level with the F-value of 2.37. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate Governance is widely accepted worldwide as an important mechanism to control management 
activities since the publishing of Cadbury Report in 1992 in UK. However, the London Stock Exchange in 1995 and 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in only 2000 have adopted the corporate governance practice. As the analysis period 
consists of 5 years from 1997 to 2001, it may not be able to analyse the effect of compliance of corporate governance 
by Malaysian Public Listed Companies mostly in 2000. This is because even if the companies have adopted various 
measures initiated by government to restore investor’s confidence, enough space is needed to adapt with the newly 
adopted corporate culture. Although previous studies in developed market exhibit the existence of relations between 
governance structure and corporate performance, this study however concludes that there is partial relation between 
corporate governance structure and corporate performance in Malaysia. While the presence of independent non-
executive directors, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership do not have any significant impact on firm’s 
performance, however, the firm size appears to have significant impact on corporate performance.  Since there no 
clear cut evidence as to good corporate governance on firms value at this point in time, further searches are needed to 
ascertain whether adoption of corporate code of conduct in Malaysia result any better performance of the listed firms. 
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